Prof. Paul Eidelberg
ISRAEL’S long-standing formula of “land for peace” is based
on an erroneous and fatal assumption, namely, that Arab rulers who agree to
negotiate with Israel on the basis of this formula are “moderate,”
i.e., are not committed to Israel’s ultimate demise. This assumption prompted
me, some 23 years ago, to set forth certain principles of statecraft enunciated
by Metternich, the great 19th century Austrian statesman on whom Henry Kissinger
wrote his doctoral dissertation.
According to Metternich, “to base one’s conduct in an important undertaking on faith in the moderation of one of the contracting parties is asking for trouble … to build on air, to gamble the future on one throw.” This faith animated the architects of the Oslo or Israel-PLO Agreement of September 1993, Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin. It remains the unshakable faith of politicians who believe that negotiations between Israel and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority can produce peace, notwithstanding a mountain of evidence to the contrary.
As Metternich saw, to expect the leaders of a dictatorship—and Arafat’s Palestinian Authority is a dictatorship—to be moderate is like asking them to destroy the foundation of their existence.
Here let me paraphrase and comment on other Metternichean principles:
(1) Any plan conceived in moderate terms must fail when the circumstances are
set in the extreme. Hence, in any situation where each of the possible lines
of action involves difficulty, the strongest line is the best. (Notice how the
United States constantly asks Israel to exercise moderation or “self-restraint”
vis-a-vis her enemies, be it Arafat or Hizbullah.)
(2) Compromise is the easy refuge of irresolute or unprincipled men. Of course
compromise is appropriate when dealing with temporary and partial interests.
But a nation’s survival is not a matter of compromise. (The trouble is
that the mentality of commercial democratic societies
induces its leaders to compromise even on issues affecting the nation’s survival.)
(3) Nations with democratic forms of government are not for that reason the
natural allies of each other or the implacable foes of dictatorships. (This
principle prompted me, shortly after making aliya in August 1976, to warn then
defense minister Shimon Peres, that the American government, animated by its
interests in the Persian Gulf, would use the Arab propaganda of “self-determination
of the Palestinian people” as a fig leaf to force Israel back to its indefensible
1949 borders.)
(4) In this age (of publicity) the first care of government must be not only to be right, but, even more important, to see that everything is called by its right name. (Israeli leaders constantly violate this principle. Even in the midst of war they disarm their countrymen by intoning the mantra of “peace.”)
(5) Weaker states can ill-afford merely to react to events; they must also try to initiate them. (The very contrary of this principle was taught by the late professor Y. Harkabi, one-time head of Israel’s “War College.” This teaching surely contributed to Barak’s and Sharon’s policy of “restraint” vis-a-vis Arafat’s Palestinian terrorists in the Rosh HaShana War.)
(6) We must rely for the execution of our plans on ourselves alone and on such means as we possess. (Israeli governments repeatedly violate this principle by relying excessively on the United States.)
(7) When called upon to handle important matters, the statesman must tackle them vigorously. For this to happen it is necessary that the course decided upon should not only be clear in the eyes of the Cabinet, but should also be made clear in the eyes of the public.
This last principle has been violated again an again by virtually every Israeli government. But it should be understood that Israel’s parliamentary electoral system, which installs several parties with different agendas in the cabinet, is largely responsible for the indecisive and inconsistent character of Israeli governments. This is why I have long proposed fundamental reform of Israel’s political system.