Professor Paul Eidelberg
Small parties are commonplace in Israel. They multiply as a result of Israel’s
system of proportional representation with an electoral threshold of 1.5%, by
far the lowest in the democratic world (except Holland). A party need only obtain
1.5% of the votes cast in a national election to obtain two seats in Israel’s
120-member Knesset. Some three million ballots were cast in the 1996 Knesset
elections, so that to win the minimum of two seats, a party had to receive only
45,000 votes.
The question arises: To what extent are small parties conducive to Israel’s
national interests? But first, how shall we define a “small” party?
Although the definition will be somewhat arbitrary, let us say that in a 120-member
Knesset, a party having five seats -- roughly 4% -- is “small.”
A somewhat larger figure might also be reasonable, in view of the fact that
many countries have higher electoral thresholds. (Liechtenstein, with a population
of only 31,461, has an 8% threshold! And by the way, David Ben-Gurion wanted
a 10% threshold for Israel.)
Now, what are the alleged advantages of a low threshold yielding small parties?
First, its supporters contend that a low threshold is more democratic, since
it enables small minority groups to be represented in the legislature. This
argument may be reduced to an absurdity, since its logic requires not only a
further reduction of the threshold, but enlarging the membership of the Knesset
to accommodate a larger number of minute parties. Indeed, this logic points
to the replacement of REPRESENTATIVE democracy by PARTICIPATORY democracy, in
which every citizen would represent himself in an enormous assembly -- a “New
England” town meeting on a gigantic scale. (Remarkably, the computer can
make such a democracy possible!)
Making an electoral system more democratic can undermine democracy. A permissive
electoral system that multiplies the number of parties fragments not only the
legislature, but the Government. A fragmented Government can hardly execute
coherent and resolute national policies. The Netanyahu Government consists of
seven parties, each with its own agenda. The entire nation, including groups
represented by small parties, suffers as a consequence. Democracy, therefore,
is not an adequate justification for small parties.
A second argument for small parties is that they can prevent the tyranny of
a large party. There is no solid evidence that small parties have such power,
or that tyranny is the likely consequence of eliminating small parties. The
8% threshold in Liechtenstein and even higher thresholds for other democracies
refute the advocates of small parties. But to clinch the point, recall the Weimar
Republic, whose democratic system of proportional representation with a low
electoral threshold enabled Hitler’s National Socialist Party to gain
power and establish a monstrous tyranny!
A third argument for small parties is that they raise controversial issues which
large parties avoid to attract the largest number of voters. In other words,
large parties, typically centrist, tend to ignore important issues. There is
truth in this argument, but it has little if any practical significance. Consider
Israel’s small right-wing parties which, during the past, have opposed
withdrawal from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. They have had no discernible effect
on the territorial policies of Israel’s Government.
True, such parties have a Knesset forum to educate public opinion regarding
the deadly results of the Oslo or Israel-PLO Agreement. But there are members
of the Likud which have denounced that agreement -- some have called for its
renunciation -- which they can do with greater effect on public opinion than
a “fringe” party. Nor is this all.
The negative consequences of small right-wing parties in Israel far outweigh
whatever good may be attributed to them, and for this reason. These small right-wing
parties are usually labeled “extremist,” if not “racist.”
Such labels, which take the place of reasoned argument, are then used to discredit
and defame those who share the views of these small parties, but do so within
a larger framework of ideas and political considerations. Which means that the
alleged advantage of small parties, namely, that they raise controversial issues
avoided by large parties, may actually prove counterproductive. A small party
may sully or undermine an intrinsically just policy precisely because that policy
is endorsed by a small party!
Now, in the present writer’s judgment based on extensive research and
experience, Israel would do well to adopt an electoral threshold of at least
5%. This would induce small parties to join one or another large party wherein
to advocate their program. However, this 5% threshold should be employed in
MULTIDISTRICT ELECTIONS. Given the issues that dominate Israel -- too complex
to be discussed here -- a 5% threshold would probably EVENTUATE in three Jewish,
NATIONAL parties or party coalitions: secular “left,” secular “right,”
and “religious.” But what of the Arab parties, a no longer insistent
concern of any small right-wing party?
A Knesset composed in accordance with the previous paragraph, a Knesset whose
members would for the first time be accountable to the voters, would to that
extent be constrained by Jewish public opinion. Since the Government is linked
to the Knesset, the Government could the more readily be induced to enforce
the law prohibiting parties which deny the Jewish or democratic character of
the state. Let this serve as a brief commentary on the futility of small parties
on the one hand, and the importance of multidistrict elections on the other.